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Abstract 
 
We applied the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model to detect possible bubbles and crashes 
related to the Brexit/Bremain referendum scheduled for 23rd June 2016. Our 
implementation includes an enhanced model calibration using Genetic Algorithms. We 
selected a few historical financial series sensitive to the Brexit/Bremain scenario, 
representative of multiple asset classes. 
We found that equity and currency asset classes show no bubble signals, while rates, credit 
and real estate show super-exponential behaviour and instabilities typical of bubble regime. 
Our study suggests that, under the JLS model, equity and currency markets do not expect 
crashes or sharp rises following the referendum results. Instead, rates and credit markets 
consider the referendum a risky event, expecting either a Bremain scenario or a Brexit 
scenario edulcorated by central banks intervention. In the case of real estate, a crash is 
expected, but its relationship with the referendum results is unclear. 
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1. Brexit or Bremain ? 
On Dec. 17, 2015 the UK Parliament approved the European Union Referendum Act 2015 to 
hold a referendum on whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the 
European Union (EU). The referendum will be held2 on Jun. 23, 2016, with the following 
Q&A:  
 Q: ”Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave 
the European Union? 
 A1: “Remain a member of the European Union” 
 A2: “Leave the European Union” 
The two scenarios above were called “Bremain” and “Brexit”, respectively. In case of Brexit 
decision, there is no immediate withdrawal. Instead, a negotiation period begins to establish 
the future relationship between UK and EU. The negotiation length is two years, extendible 
upon agreement between the two parties. For example, the agreements between EU and 
Switzerland took 10 years of negotiations. 
Referendum campaigning has been suspended on 16th June 2016 following the shooting of 
Labour MP Jo Cox. This event has had a strong impact on the public opinion, rapidly changing 
the opinion polls and possibly the attitude of the country. 
 
Forecasting the results of the 23rd June 2016 referendum, given the apparent parity between 
Bremain and Brexit supporters and the high percentage of undecided voters observed until 
the week before, is clearly a very challenging task, with a high error probability. Nevertheless, 
there exist at least three sources of data supporting forecast analysis: opinion polls [8] [10], 
bookmakers betting odds [9], and market data [10]. In this paper we recur to a different 
forecasting approach, described in the next section. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
We applied a forecasting methodology based on the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model, 
developed since the 90s at ETHZ by D. Sornette and co-authors (see e.g. [1]-[4] and refs. 
therein). The JLS model has been extensively applied to bubbles, crashes and crisis analysis 
in many fields. For applications in finance see e.g. the Financial Crisis Observatory [5]. 
 
The JLS model assumes that, during a bubble regime, the asset mean value follows the so-
called Log-Periodic Power Law (LPPL) function,  
 
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝑡) = 𝐴 + 𝐵(𝑡𝑐 − 𝑡)
𝑚 + 𝐶(𝑡𝑐 − 𝑡)
𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝜔 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑐 − 𝑡) + 𝜙),   
 
                                                 
2 We stress that this paper was delivered before the UK referendum scheduled for 23rd June 2016. 
  
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛[𝔼𝑡[𝑝(𝑇)]] = 𝑙𝑛[𝑝(𝑡)],    (1) 
 
 
where 𝑝(𝑡) is the asset price and 𝔼𝑡[𝑝(𝑇)] denotes the conditional expectation of the future 
value 𝑝(𝑇) at present time 𝑡 < 𝑇, given all information available up to time t. In eq. (1) 
above, 𝐴 is the value 𝑙𝑛[𝑝(𝑡𝑐)] at the critical time, 𝐵 < 0 is the increase in 𝑙𝑛[𝑝(𝑡)] over the 
time unit before the crash if C were to be close to zero, 0 < 𝑚 < 1 should be positive to 
ensure a finite price at the critical time 𝑡𝑐 and lower than one to quantify the super-
exponential acceleration of price 𝑝(𝑡) , 𝐶 ≠ 0  is the proportional magnitude of the 
oscillations around the exponential growth 𝜔 is the frequency of the oscillations during the 
bubble, and finally 0 < 𝜙 < 2𝜋 is a phase factor. Note that the seven JLS parameters 
{𝐴,  𝐵,  𝐶,  𝑚,  𝜔,  𝜙,  𝑡𝑐} are all free parameters that must be calibrated to fit the asset’s 
historical series, without imposing a known critical time 𝑡𝑐. Extensive backtesting of the JLS 
model on past bubbles allowed to identify more stringent parameters constraints, namely 
0.1 < 𝑚 < 0.9, 6 < 𝜔 < 13, and |C| < 1 [3]. 
 
Overall, the JLS model describes the dynamics of a system with a growing instability, 
generated by behaviors of investors and traders that create positive feedback in the 
valuation of assets leading to unsustainable growth and culminating with a finite-time 
singularity at some future critical time 𝑡𝑐, which is interpreted as the forecast of a possible 
crash. A voluminous literature has applied this model (and slightly different versions) to 
various financial data, detecting many historical cases to which the log-periodic apparatus 
could be applied. We refer the reader to [1]-[4] and to references therein for more details. 
 
Our implementation of the JLS model is based on the original version [1]-[4], enhanced with 
robust global optimization methods, i.e. Genetic Algorithms, for model calibration [6]. The 
JLS model calibration requires the optimal fit of the historical series with the LPPL function. 
The fit is optimal if the set ℘ = {𝐴,  𝐵,  𝐶,  𝑚,  𝜔,  𝜙,  𝑡𝑐} of LPPL parameters minimizes the 
root mean square error between the historical series and the LPPL fit function, 𝑅𝑀𝑆(℘)2 =
∑ [𝑝(𝑡𝑖) − 𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿(𝑡𝑖, ℘)]
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ,  where {𝑡1⋯𝑡𝑁}  and {𝑝1⋯𝑝𝑁}  are the historical dates and 
prices, respectively.  
The calibration problem above is computationally hard, since the oscillating term in the LPPL 
function produces many local minima in the RMS error function, where the minimization 
algorithm get trapped. This is the reason why different calibration strategies have been 
proposed in the literature [3]. Our global optimization approach attacks the problem without 
any assumption on the shape of the LPPL hyper-surface3 and ensures to find the global 
minimum corresponding to the optimal fit. Clearly, such approach is much more 
computationally demanding, and required appropriate parallel computing facilities [7].  
 
We applied the JLS model to a selection of historical financial series sensitive to the current 
Brexit/Bremain scenario. For each series, we run multiple model calibrations with different 
calibration windows, and detected possible bubble signals, corresponding to possible critical 
times 𝑡𝑐 . Such bubble signals were accepted or rejected according to the constraint 
discussed above. This procedure ensures the stability of the observed results. 
 
 
                                                 
3 In particular, we do not use taboo search or multiple local optimizations as described in [3]. 
  
3. Results 
The results are reported in the following Figure 1- Figure 8. The description of the market 
data and the comments are included in their corresponding captions. Each chart shows, on 
the left hands scale, the historical series (blue line), and one representative fit with LPPL 
function in eq. (1) (red line) among many calibrations run with different calibration windows. 
The histograms reported on the right hand scale count the bubble signals (if any). In case of 
no bubble signals, no histograms appear. 
 
The interpretation of the occurrence or not of the JLS bubble signal deserves some attention. 
The theory behind the JLS model states that if investors in some asset expect a future event 
(e.g. the UK Referendum) leading to a possible negative scenario for that asset (e.g. Brexit), 
this may trigger an asset dynamics leading to a bubble regime, possibly followed by a crash. 
Thus, reversing the argument, if one detects bubble signals for an asset and knows how a 
future event will affect the asset price, then one can state that the investors expect a 
negative scenario for that asset.  
Translating into the Brexit context, if one detects bubble signals for an asset with a critical 
time 𝑡𝑐 around June 23th, and knows that Brexit/Bremain are negative/positive scenarios for 
that asset, respectively, one can conclude that investors are expecting Brexit. The specular 
argument also holds: if one knows that Bremain/Brexit are negative/positive scenarios for 
that asset, respectively, one can conclude that investors are expecting Bremain. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 Source: Brexit Equity Index (Bloomberg BBRXEQT Index), basket of 10 UK stocks designed 
to reflect British exposure to the EU across different sectors. Data up to Friday 17th June 
2016. 
 Comments: the historical series shows a decreasing trend, but no super-exponential 
behaviour and instabilities typical of bubble regime. In fact, the JLS model (LPPL fit) does 
not propose valid bubble and crash signals.  
 Interpretation: market participants are currently suspicious about UK stock market, but 
do not actually fear either a crash following Brexit or a sharp rise following Bremain. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2 
 Source: gold prices (Bloomberg XAU BGN Crncy). Data up to Friday 17th June 2016. 
 Comments: the historical series shows an increasing trend, but no super-exponential 
behaviour and instabilities typical of bubble regime. In fact, the JLS model (LPPL fit) does 
not propose valid bubble and crash signals.  
 Interpretation: market participants are currently refuging into gold, but do actually fear 
neither a sharp rise following Brexit nor a crash following Bremain. This result is 
consistent with the BBRXEQT and GBPUSD FX rate observations.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 Source: GBP/USD FX rate (Bloomberg GBPUSD BGN Crncy). Data up to Friday 17th June 
2016. 
 Comments: the historical series shows an erratic trend, no super-exponential behaviour 
and instabilities typical of bubble regime. In fact, the JLS model (LPPL fit) does not 
propose valid bubble and crash signals.  
 Interpretation: market participants but do not actually fear either a crash following 
Brexit or a sharp rise following Bremain. This result is consistent with the BBRXEQT and 
GBPUSD FX rate observations. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4 
 Source: GBP/EUR FX rate (Bloomberg GBPEUR BGN Crncy). Data up to Friday 17th June 
2016. 
 Comments: as for GBP/USD 
 Interpretation: as for GBP/USD. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 Source: FTSE ORB Total Return GBP Index (Bloomberg TFTSEORB Index), includes GBP 
fixed coupon Corporate bonds trading on LSE across different industry sectors and 
maturity bands. Data up to Friday 17th June 2016. 
 Comments: the historical series shows an upward trend (due to the overall lowering 
discount rates, driven by lowering GBPLibor w.r.t. increasing GBP credit spreads) and 
super-exponential growth and instabilities typical of bubble regime. In fact, the JLS 
model (LPPL fit) propose several valid crash signals around 23th June.  
 Interpretation: market participants consider the referendum a risky event for corporate 
bonds, expecting either a Bremain scenario or the BoE intervention in case of Brexit. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6 
 Source: GBPLibor3M vs GBP OIS 3M (Bloomberg BP003M Index – BPSWSC Crncy). 
Measures the London interbank credit and liquidity risk on 3M time horizon relative to 
overnight horizon. Data up to Friday 17th June 2016. 
 Comments: the historical series shows super-exponential behavior and instabilities 
typical of bubble regime. In fact, the JLS model (LPPL fit) does propose valid bubble and 
crash signals around 24th June.  
 Interpretation: market participants expect that the basis spread will crash back to lower 
values, corresponding to lower credit and liquidity risk in the London interbank market. 
This result is consistent with the FTSE ORB observations. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 Source: Euribor3M vs EUR OIS 3M (Bloomberg EUR003M Index – EUSWEC Crncy). 
Measures the EUR interbank credit and liquidity risk on 3M time horizon relative to 
overnight horizon. Data up to Thursday 16th June 2016. 
 Comments: the historical series shows a decreasing trend but no super-exponential 
behaviour and instabilities typical of bubble regime. In fact, the JLS model (LPPL fit) does 
not propose valid bubble and crash signals.  
 Interpretation: market participants but do not actually fear either a crash following 
Brexit, also because the expected ECB intervention, or a sharp rise following Bremain. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8 
 Source: UK house price index 9. Data up to April 2016 (this data is updated with delay). 
 Comments: the historical series shows an increasing trend with super-exponential 
behaviour and instabilities typical of bubble regime. In fact, the JLS model (LPPL fit) does 
propose valid bubble and crash signals around June.  
 Interpretation: the trend remembers those observed during the 2008 subprime crisis. 
Market participants expect a crash, but its relationship with the referendum is 
questionable, since the growth regime started before the current Brexit/Bremain context, 
and more recent UK HPI data would be needed. 
 
 
 
Table 1: summary of JLS bubble signals (col. 4) from Figure 1- Figure 8. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
We applied a forecasting methodology based on the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model, 
developed since the 90s by D. Sornette at ETHZ and co-authors [1][1], and extensively 
applied to detect bubbles, crashes and crisis in many fields [5]. Our implementation includes 
an enhanced model calibration using robust global optimization methods, i.e. Genetic 
Algorithms [6].  
 
We applied the JLS model to a selection of historical financial series sensitive to the current 
Brexit/Bremain scenario, representative of equity (BBRXEQT), currency (Gold, GBPUSD and 
GBPEUR fx), rates and credit (FTSE ORB, GBP and EUR Libor – OIS basis), and real estate (UK 
HPI) asset classes. 
 
We found the following evidence (see Table 1): 
# Asset class Historical series JLS bubble signals
1 Equity Bloomberg Brexit Equity Index NO
2 Gold NO
3 GBPUSD Spot FX Rate NO
4 GBPEUR Spot FX Rate NO
5 FTSE ORB Total Return GBP Index YES
6 GBP Libor - GBP OIS 3M basis YES
7 Euribor - EUR OIS 3M basis NO
8 Real estate UK House Price Index YES
Currency
Rates and credit
  
 equity and currency asset classes show no bubble signals,  
 rates, credit and real estate show super-exponential behaviour and instabilities 
typical of bubble regime, with the exception of Euribor-EUR OIS basis. 
 
Out study suggests that, under the JLS model, the following interpretations can be drawn: 
 equity and currency: market participants coherently do not expect crashes or sharp 
rises following the referendum results. 
 Rates and credit: market participants coherently consider the referendum a risky 
event for the London market, expecting either a Bremain scenario or a Brexit 
scenario edulcorated by central banks intervention.  
 In the case of real estate, market participants expect a crash, but its relationship with 
the referendum results is unclear. 
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